and '3N2' lineages in the gecko [12] , respectively. Within the parthenogenetic lineages, DNA sequence diversity is extremely low. Because mitochondrial DNA is inherited through mothers only, it is possible to determine the maternal sexual ancestors of hybrid parthenogens. In the grasshopper, this is P169 for both phylads; in the gecko it is a western clade of race CA6 for 3N1 and a western clade of race SM6 for 3N2. In grasshoppers and geckos, the DNA sequences of the more widespread parthenogenetic lineage differ more from those of their maternal sexual progenitors than those of the more geographically restricted lineage, suggesting that the widespread lineages are older.
The interpretation of these patterns is that early, roughly coeval hybridization events in Australia's west formed the parthenogenetic Standard phylad (grasshopper) and the 3N1 lineage (gecko), while later events formed the Boulder-Zanthus phylad and 3N2. Each time, the parthenogens' formation was followed by their eastward expansion in parallel waves. Assuming a molecular clock, the ages of the parthenogens can be estimated from their DNA sequences. These estimates are consistent with this interpretation. Yet the wide confidence intervals typical for such estimates would not allow the exclusion of alternative scenarios.
What could be the forces driving these parallel patterns? The age estimates of parthenogenetic grasshoppers and geckos suggest that they originated and spread in the late Pleistocene, a time when deserts in Australia expanded and contracted in cycles of approximately 100,000 years [13] . Such climatic oscillations may well be the general driving force. First, they alter species ranges and may bring formerly separated species into contact, providing the opportunity for hybridization. How do brain systems support our subjective experience of recollection and our senses of familiarity and novelty? A new functional imaging study concludes that each of these functions is accomplished by a distinct component of the medial temporal lobe, shedding new light on the functional organization of this memory system.
Howard Eichenbaum
A central goal of systems neuroscience is to identify the functional organization of the brain's information processing systems. Major successes have been achieved in delineating each of the perceptual systems, as well as motor, attentional and emotional systems. The visual system, for example, is composed of over 30 functionally distinct areas which are hierarchically organized in two distinct pathways that process either 'what' a visual object is or 'where' it is located in visual space [1] . Progress has also been made in delineating systems that support some types of learning, including conditioned motor responses [2] and the attachment of emotional significance to stimuli [3] . The most obvious exception is the system that supports our ability for conscious remembering, called declarative memory. It is well known that declarative memory relies on the medial temporal lobe. But the nature and organization of the contributions of individual structures within the medial temporal lobe are unclear.
A recent article by Daselaar et al. [4] presents compelling evidence for different functional roles of the major structures of the medial temporal lobe. Their experimental design was based on behavioral evidence that declarative memory can be expressed in two distinct conscious experiences: the recollection of an item, such as a person, object or word, and its associates in an all-or-none fashion; and a sense of familiarity with particular items that varies continuously in strength [5] . Using functional MRI, the authors scanned subjects as they recognized previously studied words and found that the posterior hippocampus was activated selectively when subjects had allor-none recollections. By contrast, the parahippocampal cortex, as well as the anterior hippocampus, were activated parallel to the degree of familiarity, whereas the rhinal area (perirhinal and entorhinal cortex) was activated in an inverse fashion, that is, associated with the degree of a sense of novelty. This striking triple dissociation of memory for the same learning materials and within the same subjects strongly favors the view that different medial temporal lobe areas play distinct roles. But how are these areas interconnected and how are recollection, familiarity and novelty detection organized in support of declarative memory?
A lot of anatomical data are available on the cortical inputs to, and connectivity among, medial temporal lobe structures [6] . The 'what' and 'where' neocortical perceptual streams mentioned above extend into the cortical areas surrounding the hippocampus (Figure 1) . Unimodal association areas of the neocortex convey featural ('what') information about objects to the perirhinal cortex. By contrast, polymodal neocortical areas convey spatial ('where') information to the parahippocampal cortex. The 'what' and 'where' streams remain largely segregated in the next stage, as the perirhinal cortex projects primarily to the lateral entorhinal cortex whereas the parahippocampal cortex projects mainly to the medial entorhinal area. Finally, 'what' and 'where' information converge within the hippocampus. The outcomes of hippocampal processing feed back successively to the entorhinal areas, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortex, and finally, the neocortical areas from which the inputs originated.
This anatomical scheme has generated a hypothesis about the functional organization of the medial temporal lobe system [7] . During a learning experience, distinct items are initially represented in the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal cortex. Back projections to the 'what' pathways of the neocortex might support subsequent judgments of familiarity. Additionally, information about the spatial context of the experienced item is processed in the parahippocampal and medial entorhinal cortex, and then item and context information are combined in the hippocampus as a relational or conjunctive representation. Later, when memory is cued by presentation of the item, the hippocampus completes the relational representation. Back projections to the parahippocampal cortex recover the contextual representation; in addition, representations of other related associates of the cue may be reactivated in the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal areas. The recovery of context and other associations may constitute the subjective experience of recollection.
Several lines of evidence are converging to support the idea of distinct functional contributions of different components of the medial temporal lobe [8, 9] . In animals, damage to the hippocampus or parahippocampal cortex result in selective deficits in relational memory, whereas perirhinal cortex lesions result in severe deficits in recognition of individual items. Consistent with these findings, neurons in the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal cortex respond to single stimuli and signal familiarity, whereas neurons in the parahippocampal and medial entorhinal cortex respond to spatial cues. Hippocampal neurons fire associated with unique conjunctions of stimuli, their significance, the animal's behavior, and the places and contexts in which the stimuli occur [10] . Recent studies on humans support a parallel distinction, involving different roles for specific medial temporal lobe areas in recollection and familiarity [11] . Most studies on amnesia indicate that damage limited to the hippocampus results in selective deficits in recollection and relational memory, whereas the capacity to distinguish new and old items on the basis of familiarity is reported to be intact (but see [12, 13] ). Most functional imaging studies have also indicated that the hippocampus plays a selective role in recollection and relational memory, whereas the perirhinal cortex is activated during the presentation of novel items and decreasing activation levels signal familiarity. Other studies show that the parahippocampal cortex is activated during presentation of spatial scenes [14] or viewing of objects strongly associated with particular places [15] , and this area is also activated during recollection of contextual information [16] .
The new findings from Daselaar et al. [4] confirm and extend the evidence from earlier functional imaging studies. They confirm that (the posterior) part of the hippocampus is selectively involved in recollection, and the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal cortex is selectively activated by novel stimuli with progressively declining levels of activation for more familiar stimuli. The findings diverge from the literature in distinguishing the parahippocampal cortex and anterior hippocampus from the posterior hippocampus. However, the new data may be interpreted as a refinement, rather than a revision, of the functional divisions of the medial temporal lobe. Notably the direction of greater activation associated with stronger memory in the parahippocampal cortex and anterior hippocampus is the same as that in the posterior hippocampus, but the strength of activation is continuous in the former rather than all-or-none in the latter.
The methods of Daselaar et al. [4] have thus revealed differences in the dynamics of memory retrieval in these components of the system. Other differences, indicated by the earlier studies, may also distinguish these areas. Thus, the continuous activation of the parahippocampal cortex may reflect the strength or amount of information in context signals [17] . And perhaps information processing in the anterior hippocampus reflects a more continuous retrieval of relational representations than that of the posterior hippocampus [18] , and this difference may lead to a reconciliation of discrepant findings on the hippocampus [12, 13] . Future efforts will confirm or deny these speculations. Meanwhile the new findings add to an emerging story about the functional organization of the medial temporal lobe memory system. The importance of competition in determining species coexistence has been much debated. A phylogenetic analysis of sedges indicates that competitive exclusion may inhibit co-occurrence among closely related species, but not among more distant relatives.
T. Jonathan Davies
It is commonly accepted that there is a limit to the similarity of co-occurring species -the theory of 'limiting similarity' [1, 2] .
However, the deceptively simple question of how similar two species may be to each other before one competitively excludes the other has proven remarkably divisive [3, 4] . One major obstacle
